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OPINION 
________________ 
 
SMITH, Chief Judge.    
 On December 20, 2012, the Township of Scott in 
Lackawanna County, Pennsylvania enacted an ordinance 
regulating cemeteries. The ordinance authorizes officials to 
enter upon any property within the Township to determine the 
existence and location of any cemetery. The ordinance also 
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compels property owners to hold their private cemeteries 
open to the public during daylight hours. The plaintiff, Rose 
Mary Knick, challenges the ordinance on two grounds. First, 
Knick argues that the ordinance authorizes unrestrained 
searches of private property in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment. Second, Knick argues that the ordinance takes 
private property without just compensation in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment. 
 The Township’s ordinance is extraordinary and 
constitutionally suspect. However, important justiciability 
considerations preclude us from reaching the merits. Because 
Knick concedes that her Fourth Amendment rights were not 
violated and fails to demonstrate that they imminently will be, 
Knick lacks standing to advance her Fourth Amendment 
challenge. And as the District Court correctly held, Knick’s 
Fifth Amendment claims are not ripe until she has sought and 
been denied just compensation using Pennsylvania’s inverse-
condemnation procedures, as required by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Williamson County Regional Planning 
Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 
(1985). We will therefore affirm. 
I 
 On December 20, 2012, the Township of Scott enacted 
Ordinance No. 12-12-20-001, titled “Ordinance of the 
Township of Scott Township [sic], Lackawanna County, 
Pennsylvania, Relating to the Operation and Maintenance of 
Cemeteries and Burial Places” (hereinafter, the “Ordinance”). 
App. 82. The Ordinance applies to “[a]ll cemeteries, whether 
private or public, and whether existing or established prior to 
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the date of this Ordinance or hereafter created.” Id. It requires 
cemetery owners to “properly maintain and upkeep any 
cemetery.” App. 83. 
 Critical to this case are two provisions of the Ordinance. 
First, it requires that “[a]ll cemeteries within the Township 
shall be kept open and accessible to the general public during 
daylight hours. No owner . . . shall unreasonably restrict 
access to the general public nor shall any fee for access be 
charged.” Id. We will refer to this as the “public-access 
provision.” 
 Second, the Ordinance permits the Township’s “Code 
Enforcement Officer and/or his/her agents and representatives 
[to] enter upon any property within the Township for the 
purposes of determining the existence of and location of any 
cemetery, in order to ensure compliance with the terms and 
provisions of this Ordinance.” Id. We will refer to this as the 
“inspection provision.” 
 Anyone who violates the Ordinance is subject to a fine of 
between $300 and $600, and “[e]ach day that the violation 
exists shall constitute a separate offense.” Id. 
 On April 10, 2013, the Township Code Enforcement 
Officer, Carl S. Ferraro, entered Knick’s property without an 
administrative warrant. Ferraro identified certain stones on 
Knick’s property as grave markers and issued a Notice of 
Violation dated April 11, 2013. Knick disputes that a 
cemetery exists on her property. 
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 On May 7, 2013, Knick brought suit against the Township 
in the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief. Knick filed an Emergency 
Motion for Injunctive Relief on or about that same date. The 
parties stipulated that the Township would withdraw its 
Notice of Violation and further stipulated to an order staying 
any enforcement actions against Knick. A hearing was held 
on October 8, 2014. Then, on October 21, the Court ruled that 
it “will render no decision on the matter.” App. 261. 
Specifically, the Court ruled “that it is not the proper venue 
for this matter, since the case is not in the proper posture for a 
decision to be rendered on the Plaintiff’s requested forms of 
relief.” Id.1 Then, on October 31, the Township issued another 
Notice of Violation. Knick filed a Petition for Contempt of 
Court in the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, 
which the Court denied on January 30, 2015. At no point did 
Knick institute an inverse-condemnation proceeding against 
the Township. See 26 Pa. Const. Stat. Ann. § 502(c). 
 Knick filed this action on November 20, 2014 in the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania. In her original Complaint, Knick asserted four 
Counts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (I) Fourth Amendment 
claims against the Township for maintaining a warrantless 
                                                 
 1 Although not apparent from the face of the Order, a 
subsequent state-court judge opined that “[a] reasonable 
interpretation” of the Order is that “Knick’s 
constitutional challenge to the Ordinance should be 
litigated in any civil enforcement proceeding that may be 
filed by the Township.” App. 192. 
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inspection regime (the facial challenge) and entering Knick’s 
property without a warrant (the as-applied challenge); (II) a 
Fourth Amendment claim against the Township for failure to 
train its officials to obtain administrative warrants; 
(III) Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against 
Ferraro in his official capacity for entering Knick’s property 
without a warrant; and (IV) claims seeking invalidation of the 
Ordinance on Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment 
grounds, including, inter alia, vagueness, improper exercise 
of the Township’s police power, and taking private property 
without just compensation. After the Township filed its 
motion to dismiss, Knick filed an Amended Complaint, which 
added Count V for declaratory and injunctive relief. By Order 
dated October 28, 2015, the District Court dismissed Counts 
I–III with prejudice and dismissed Counts IV and V without 
prejudice. 
 Knick filed a Second Amended Complaint on November 
16, 2015. The Second Amended Complaint asserts three 
Counts: (I) the Fourth Amendment claims pled in Count I of 
the original complaint; (II) a claim that the Ordinance takes 
Knick’s private property without just compensation, in 
violation of the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments; 
and (III) claims for declaratory and injunctive relief because, 
inter alia, the Ordinance unconstitutionally takes Knick’s 
property and authorizes unconstitutional searches. By Order 
dated September 7, 2016, the District Court dismissed Count I 
with prejudice for the reasons provided in its earlier decision 
and dismissed Counts II and III without prejudice pending 
exhaustion of state-law remedies. 
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 This appeal timely followed. On appeal, Knick argues that 
the District Court erred by dismissing her Fourth Amendment 
facial challenge and by requiring her to exhaust state-law 
remedies for her takings claims. 
II 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. We have jurisdiction to review “final decisions of the 
district courts,” 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we must assure 
ourselves of our jurisdiction sua sponte, see, e.g., Kreider 
Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Glickman, 190 F.3d 113, 118 (3d Cir. 
1999). Although the District Court dismissed Knick’s Second 
Amended Complaint without prejudice as to certain claims, 
we conclude that Knick nonetheless appealed from a final 
decision. 
 A final, appealable decision is one “by which a district 
court disassociates itself from a case.” Gelboim v. Bank of 
Am. Corp., 135 S. Ct. 897, 902 (2015) (quoting Swint v. 
Chambers Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 42 (1995)). “While 
decisions of the Court have accorded § 1291 a practical rather 
than a technical construction, the statute’s core application is 
to rulings that terminate an action.” Id. (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). For that reason, dismissals without 
prejudice are ordinarily not final; leave to amend 
contemplates “further proceedings in the district court as part 
of the same action.” Doe v. Hesketh, 828 F.3d 159, 165 (3d 
Cir. 2016) (quoting Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Beazer E., Inc., 
124 F.3d 551, 560 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
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 But “[e]ven dismissals without prejudice have been held 
to be final and appealable if they end [ ][the] suit so far as the 
District Court was concerned.” Id. (alterations in original) 
(quoting GFL Advantage Fund, Ltd. v. Colkitt, 272 F.3d 189, 
198 n.3 (3d Cir. 2001)); see also United States v. Wallace & 
Tiernan Co., 336 U.S. 793, 794 n.1 (1949). For example, we 
will review a dismissal without prejudice if a plaintiff stands 
on the complaint rather than exercising leave to amend, 
Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854 F.3d 209, 219 (3d Cir. 2017), if a 
plaintiff argues that administrative exhaustion would be futile, 
Ghana v. Holland, 226 F.3d 175, 180–81 (3d Cir. 2000), or if 
a plaintiff’s claims are “effectively barred” from being 
subsequently reasserted due to the running of a statute of 
limitations or some similar obstacle, LNC Invs., LLC v. 
Republic Nicar., 396 F.3d 342, 346 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 Here, the District Court dismissed Knick’s takings claim 
without prejudice and directed her to exhaust state remedies. 
The District Court did not retain jurisdiction and closed the 
case. Its order further specified that, following the conclusion 
of state proceedings, any remaining takings claims must be 
“re-fil[ed] . . .  in federal court.” App. 57. As such, “there 
cannot be—and, by court order, there will not be—any further 
proceedings in the district court as part of the same action.” 
Beazer E., 124 F.3d at 560. “[T]he district court has divested 
itself of [the] case entirely, regardless of the fact that claims 
in the case may continue to go forward in state court.” Erie 
Cty. Retirees Ass’n v. Cty. of Erie, 220 F.3d 193, 202 (3d Cir. 
2000). The decision in this case is therefore final “even if a 
similar case may be filed in the future because the dismissal 
was without prejudice.” Schering-Plough Healthcare Prods., 
Inc. v. Schwarz Pharma, Inc., 586 F.3d 500, 506 (7th Cir. 
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2009); see also Limnia, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 857 F.3d 
379, 385–86 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Hitchcock v. Cumberland Univ. 
403(b) DC Plan, 851 F.3d 552, 557–58 (6th Cir. 2017); 
Eastman Kodak Co. v. STWB, Inc., 452 F.3d 215, 219 (2d Cir. 
2006) (“[A] dismissal without prejudice, absent some 
retention of jurisdiction, is a final decision . . . .”); cf. Blair v. 
Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(dismissal without prejudice in favor of arbitration is 
appealable where the District Court did not retain jurisdiction, 
even though further court proceedings may ensue following 
arbitration). 
 Thus, we are satisfied that the District Court’s decision is 
a “final” one, and we have appellate jurisdiction under 
§ 1291. We proceed to Knick’s claims. 
III 
 We begin with Knick’s facial Fourth Amendment 
challenge. We conclude that she lacks Article III standing 
because she has failed to demonstrate an injury-in-fact and 
redressability. 
A 
 The Second Amended Complaint asserts both facial and 
as-applied challenges to the Ordinance under the Fourth 
Amendment. As part of her as-applied challenge, Knick 
claimed to be injured by an unlawful search of her property. 
But the District Court ruled that the search in question was 
lawful, and Knick does not appeal that ruling. Although not 
10 
 
initially raised by the parties,2 the question before us is 
whether Knick may persist in her facial Fourth Amendment 
challenge even though her own rights were not violated. 
Following supplemental briefing and oral argument by the 
parties, we conclude that Knick has failed to carry her burden 
to demonstrate Article III standing to challenge the Ordinance 
on Fourth Amendment grounds. 
 “[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing 
contains three elements”: injury in fact, causation, and 
redressability. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–
61 (1992). As “[t]he party invoking federal jurisdiction,” 
Knick “bears the burden of establishing these elements.” Id. 
at 561. “Plaintiffs must have standing at all stages of the 
litigation,” and certain findings by a district court may require 
a subsequent reevaluation of standing. Pub. Interest Research 
Grp. of N.J., Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111, 
117 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 The first element, injury in fact, “is often determinative.” 
Toll Bros. v. Twp. of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 138 (3d Cir. 
2009). The plaintiff must demonstrate “an invasion of a 
legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
                                                 
 2 The Township did advance the curious argument 
that Knick’s claim fails the requirements of Monell v. 
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), 
because Knick failed to demonstrate a cognizable injury. 
But that is not a requirement unique to Monell; it is a 
general requirement of all cases and controversies under 
Article III of the Constitution. 
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particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or 
hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). To be concrete, an injury need not 
be “tangible,” but “it must actually exist.” Spokeo, Inc. v. 
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548–49 (2016). “For an injury to be 
‘particularized,’ it ‘must affect the plaintiff in a personal and 
individual way.’” Id. at 1548 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 
n.1). Generalized grievances will not suffice. See Schuchardt 
v. President of the U.S., 839 F.3d 336, 344–45 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(distinguishing between generalized and widely shared 
grievances). Furthermore, “[a]lthough imminence is 
concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched 
beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury 
is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury 
is certainly impending.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. 
Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 564 n.2). If 
the injury is sufficient under those standards, it must also be 
“fairly traceable to the challenged action[] and redressable by 
a favorable ruling” in accordance with the remaining two 
elements of standing. Id. (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson 
Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)). 
 In this case, the District Court ruled that the search of 
Knick’s property complied with the Fourth Amendment 
because Ferraro searched an open field. “[A]n open field, 
unlike the curtilage of a home, is not one of those protected 
areas enumerated in the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. 
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 411 (2012) (citation omitted) (citing 
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 176–77 (1984)). 
Because Knick does not challenge that ruling on appeal, she 
has accepted the District Court’s conclusion that her Fourth 
Amendment rights were not violated. She has likewise 
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accepted that her property was not even “searched” in the 
constitutional sense. Id. at 411 n.8. Even if Township officials 
were likely to return to the same part of Knick’s property for 
further inspections, those would also be open-field searches 
not subject to Fourth Amendment protection. As discussed 
below, nothing in the record suggests that any future 
inspections would invade her home’s curtilage. 
 As a result, any “injury” arising from open-field searches 
would not be legally protected. See Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. 
U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 772 (2000) (“The interest 
must consist of obtaining compensation for, or preventing, the 
violation of a legally protected right.”). Nor would that injury 
be redressable. If we were to enjoin the Ordinance’s 
inspection provision today, the Township would still be able 
to use the open-fields doctrine to enter the part of Knick’s 
property where a cemetery was allegedly discovered.3 Put 
differently, Knick’s situation is one “for which [the 
Ordinance] is irrelevant”; the Ordinance does “no work” in 
authorizing searches that would be independently lawful 
                                                 
 3 While an open-field search does not run afoul of the 
Fourth Amendment, it may still constitute trespass. See 
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 183. Knick does not argue that 
Ordinance allows Township officials to avoid liability for 
trespass. And even if it did, Knick does not argue that 
injury arising from a lack of trespass remedy could 
confer standing to mount a Fourth Amendment challenge 
where no Fourth Amendment injury has occurred or is 
imminent. 
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under established Fourth Amendment doctrines. Los Angeles 
v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2451 (2015). 
 Perhaps realizing these deficiencies, Knick changed tack 
in her supplemental brief. Now Knick attempts to premise 
standing on the fact that the Ordinance may permit the 
Township to search the curtilage of her home—an area of her 
property that is protected by the Fourth Amendment. See 
Knick Supp. Br. 3 (“Knick owns property, including curtilage, 
subject to this provision. She has alleged the Ordinance 
authorizes an invasion of her property. That is enough for 
standing, particularly at this early stage.” (citations omitted)). 
 There are two problems with this theory. First, simply 
owning property protected by the Fourth Amendment 
describes a generalized grievance common to all residents of 
the Township. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 575–76. We have 
recognized standing to challenge government search 
programs that are “universal in scope,” but not before 
ensuring that the plaintiffs’ injuries were “unmistakably 
personal.” Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 346. Knick has not alleged 
any personal harm arising from a threatened or actual 
curtilage search. Second, Knick cannot base standing on a 
future invasion of her home’s curtilage without demonstrating 
an “actual or imminent, not conjectural and hypothetical” 
injury. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Simply owning property subject to a hypothetical 
search is “too speculative for Article III purposes.” Clapper, 
133 S. Ct. at 1147. Compare id. at 1148 (holding that 
plaintiffs lacked standing to bring facial Fourth Amendment 
challenge to a statute authorizing NSA surveillance because 
plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a “certainly impending” risk 
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that their communications would be intercepted), with Free 
Speech Coal., Inc. v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 825 F.3d 149, 166–67 
(3d Cir. 2016) (holding that plaintiffs demonstrated standing 
to bring facial Fourth Amendment challenge where, inter alia, 
the plaintiffs incurred costs complying with a regulation that 
specifically targeted their type of business).4 
 Accordingly, we conclude that Knick failed to 
demonstrate a redressable injury-in-fact and therefore lacks 
standing.5 
                                                 
 4 There is no substantively lenient standard “at this 
early stage” as Knick claimed. Knick Supp. Br. 3. 
“[E]ach element must be supported . . . with the manner 
and degree of evidence required at the successive stages 
of the litigation.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. As such, we 
simply apply the pleading standard to determine if 
Knick’s allegations are sufficient to establish each 
element of standing. Even accepting Knick’s allegations 
as true, they are insufficient for the reasons provided 
above. 
 5 Our holding can also be understood in terms of 
ripeness, which “originate[s] from the same Article III 
requirement of a case or controversy.” Free Speech 
Coal., 825 F.3d at 167 n.15. “[I]f no injury has occurred, 
the plaintiff can be told either that she cannot sue, or that 
she cannot sue yet.” Id. (quoting Presbytery of New 
Jersey of Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 
F.3d 1454, 1462 (3d Cir. 1994)). If Knick or any other 
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B 
 In an attempt to salvage her Fourth Amendment claim, 
Knick argues that she has standing to assert a pure facial 
challenge without raising, much less proving, an 
accompanying as-applied challenge. Our holding, however, is 
rooted in time-tested principles of justiciability, not in any 
special attribute of facial or as-applied challenges. As courts 
and commentators have recognized, those labels often 
introduce confusion, and “the distinction . . . is not so well 
defined that it has some automatic effect.” Citizens United v. 
Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 331 (2010); see 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial Challenges and 
Third-Party Standing, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1321, 1336 (2000) 
[hereinafter Fallon, As-Applied and Facial Challenges] 
(arguing that facial and as-applied challenges are not “sharply 
categorically distinct”). Nonetheless, there are several points 
about the interaction between those concepts that we must 
clarify. 
                                                                                                             
resident of the Township can demonstrate a cognizable 
injury arising from a search independently authorized by 
the Ordinance, such as a curtilage search, then the 
Ordinance may be ripe for judicial review. Once such a 
claim is properly presented, the Ordinance cannot be 
upheld on the ground that individual searches might be 
“conducted under an exception to the warrant 
requirement[] or pursuant to a warrant itself,” because 
those scenarios are “irrelevant to our analysis of a 
statute’s facial validity.” Id. at 168 (citing Patel, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2451). 
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 As a general matter, Knick’s argument is correct: there is 
no requirement that a facial challenge be accompanied by an 
as-applied challenge. See, e.g., Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443. 
Litigants with standing to challenge a law have considerable 
“flexibility . . . to shape the issues in litigation.” Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 Cal. 
L. Rev. 915, 947 (2011) [hereinafter Fallon, Fact and 
Fiction]. Litigants may argue that the law cannot be 
constitutionally applied to them due to some particular set of 
facts or circumstances (an as-applied challenge), that the law 
is unconstitutional in every application, including their own (a 
facial challenge), or both.6 
 However, even if a litigant does not allege a violation as 
applied, the law in question must still typically be applied—
or at least be at risk of imminent application. That is because 
plaintiffs must always demonstrate the “irreducible 
constitutional minimum” of Article III standing. Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 560. Facial challenges are no exception. See Williams 
                                                 
 6 See United States v. Marcavage, 609 F.3d 264, 273 
(3d Cir. 2010) (defining as-applied challenges as those 
that “contend that a law[’s] . . . application to a particular 
person under particular circumstances deprived that 
person of a constitutional right”); New Directions 
Treatment Servs. v. City of Reading, 490 F.3d 293, 308 
n.11 (3d Cir. 2007) (defining facial challenges as those 
brought by “a single party [who] asserts that a law is 
invalid not only as applied to them, but as applied to all 
parties that might come before the court” (emphasis 
added)). 
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v. Lew, 819 F.3d 466, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Furthermore, as a 
prudential matter, a party “must assert his own legal rights 
and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal 
rights or interests of third parties.” Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 
U.S. 125, 129 (2004) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 
499 (1975)). That prudential rule is relaxed in certain 
doctrinal contexts, most notably in First Amendment claims.7 
See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611–12 (1973); 
Osediacz v. City of Cranston, 414 F.3d 136, 140–41 (1st Cir. 
2005); see also Pa. Prison Soc’y v. Cortés, 508 F.3d 156, 
168–69 (3d Cir. 2007) (declining to extend the solicitude 
shown in the “highly exceptional First Amendment context” 
to facial challenges raised under the Ex Post Facto and Due 
Process clauses). 
                                                 
 7 The solicitude shown to First Amendment rights is 
likely inapplicable in the Fourth Amendment context. It 
is well established that “Fourth Amendment rights are 
personal rights . . . which may not be vicariously 
asserted.” Schuchardt, 839 F.3d at 346 (alteration in 
original) (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 
165, 174 (1969)). Thus, if Knick attempted to base 
standing on the Fourth Amendment rights of hypothetical 
third parties, standing would be strongly disfavored for 
prudential reasons even if she suffered a cognizable 
injury-in-fact. Cf. Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 
21, 69 (1974) (holding that a bank could not assert the 
Fourth Amendment rights of its customers). Knick wisely 
does not invoke third-party standing here. 
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 Plaintiffs with standing to challenge a law may assert 
solely facial challenges, but in doing so they accept a higher 
substantive burden. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly 
intoned, facial challenges are “the most difficult . . . to mount 
successfully” because the challenger “must establish that no 
set of circumstances exist under which the [statute] would be 
valid.” Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2449, 2450 (alterations in original) 
(quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987)).8 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly discouraged litigants from 
asserting facial challenges—particularly where surveying the 
full range of possible applications is made difficult by a bare-
bones record or a need for technical expertise. See, e.g., Wash. 
State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 
450–51 (2008) (noting that facial challenges are disfavored 
because, in part, they “threaten to short circuit the democratic 
process”); Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167 (2007) 
(noting that facial challenges to an abortion-related law 
“should not have been entertained in the first instance,” and 
instead should have been presented as “preenforcement, as-
applied challenges” so that the Court could better assess “the 
nature of the medical risk” alleged); Sabri v. United States, 
541 U.S. 600, 608–10 (2004) (noting that “facial challenges 
are best when infrequent” because “they invite judgments on 
                                                 
 8 We note that “some Members of the [Supreme] 
Court have criticized the Salerno formulation,” Wash. 
State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 
442, 449 (2008), but the Supreme Court recently 
reaffirmed that Salerno applies at least in the Fourth 
Amendment context, Patel, 135 S. Ct. at 2450. 
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fact-poor records” and “depart[] from the norms of 
adjudication in federal courts”). 
 If a litigant decides to bring both types of challenge, a 
court’s ruling on one might affect the other. For example, 
ruling that a law is facially invalid “negates any need” to 
address an as-applied challenge. Heffner v. Murphy, 745 F.3d 
56, 65 n.7 (3d Cir. 2014). But if a litigant loses an as-applied 
challenge because the court rules as a matter of law that the 
statute or ordinance was constitutionally applied to her, it 
follows a fortiori that the law is not unconstitutional in all 
applications. Dickerson v. Napolitano, 604 F.3d 732, 741 (2d 
Cir. 2010); see also Cty. Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen, 442 
U.S. 140, 154–56 (1979) (holding that criminal defendants 
could not mount a facial challenge to a statute that had been 
constitutionally applied at their trial); United States v. Raines, 
362 U.S. 17, 24–25 (1960); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 
865, 882–83 (4th Cir. 2013); Mosby v. Ligon, 418 F.3d 927, 
933 (8th Cir. 2005). If the litigant loses an as-applied 
challenge because the law was not in fact applied, or the law 
did no work in authorizing the Government’s challenged 
conduct, then courts should be careful to ensure that any 
remaining challenges are justiciable. See Sorrell v. IMS 
Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 569 (2011) (noting that, in Los 
Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing 
Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40–41 (1999), a facial challenge was 
unavailable because “the plaintiff had not suffered a personal 
First Amendment injury and could prevail only by invoking 
the rights of others”). 
 On the other hand, there are situations where a failure on 
one claim might not preclude success on the other. If a litigant 
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loses an as-applied challenge because the allegedly 
unconstitutional circumstances of enforcement are simply 
“not supported by [the] record,” Heffner, 745 F.3d at 65 n.7, 
and the litigant otherwise has standing to challenge a law 
(such as a defendant in an enforcement action), then “a court 
cannot simply refuse to address a facial challenge that offers a 
defendant her last chance to argue that the statute being 
enforced against her is constitutionally invalid.” Fallon, Fact 
and Fiction at 963. And of course, a litigant who fails to 
prove that a law is unconstitutional in all applications might 
still prove that it was applied unconstitutionally to her. Cf. 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2305 
(2016) (holding that losing earlier preenforcment facial 
challenge did not preclude postenforcement as-applied 
challenge). 
 A recent illustration of these principles is Los Angeles v. 
Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443 (2015), where the Supreme Court 
approved of a standalone facial challenge arising under the 
Fourth Amendment. Patel involved an ordinance that 
authorized law enforcement officials to search hotel registries 
without an administrative warrant. Several hotel operators 
sued, claiming that the ordinance was facially invalid. In 
Patel, the challenged ordinance had been, and would have 
continued to be, applied against the hotels to authorize 
warrantless searches. The parties stipulated as much, 
satisfying the imminence requirement. Id. at 2448. Thus, the 
plaintiffs presented a dispute about whether their rights would 
be violated as a function of the ordinance’s facial validity. 
Similarly, in our recent decision in Free Speech Coalition, the 
plaintiffs demonstrated an imminent risk that they would be 
subjected to an allegedly unconstitutional inspection regime. 
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825 F.3d at 166–67. Their rights likewise turned on the facial 
validity of the law in question. 
 Not so here. Knick makes no reasonable allegation that 
her Fourth Amendment rights (or anyone else’s) were, or will 
imminently be, violated. The fact that Knick challenges the 
Ordinance on its face does not relieve her from that 
fundamental burden. 
*     *     * 
 We recognize that the Ordinance’s inspection provision “is 
constitutionally suspect and we encourage the [Township] to 
abandon it (or, at least, to modify it substantially).” Osediacz, 
414 F.3d at 143. It is difficult to imagine a broader 
authorization to conduct searches of privately owned 
property.9 But we are not a “roving commission[] assigned to 
pass judgment on the validity of the Nation’s laws.” 
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 611. We cannot adjudicate the merits 
of the inspection provision without a plaintiff who has a 
cognizable interest in the outcome. Accordingly, we will 
affirm the dismissal of Knick’s remaining Fourth Amendment 
claim on the alternative ground that Knick lacks standing. 
                                                 
 9 Knick asserted before the District Court that the 
Ordinance was enacted in retaliation for her repeated 
confrontations with Township Supervisors over their 
management decisions. The District Court dismissed this 
retaliation claim, and Knick has not appealed that ruling. 
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IV 
 We turn then to Knick’s Fifth Amendment takings claims. 
Knick argues that the Ordinance effectuates an 
uncompensated taking of her private property by requiring 
her to hold her land open to the public and to Township 
inspectors. 
 Before a takings claim is ripe, plaintiffs should (subject to 
certain exceptions) comply with two prudential requirements 
set forth in the Supreme Court’s decision Williamson County 
Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson 
City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). First, the “finality rule” requires 
that the government “has reached a final decision regarding 
the application of the regulation to the property at issue.” Id. 
at 186. Second, the plaintiff must seek and be denied just 
compensation using the state’s procedures, provided those 
procedures are adequate. Id. at 194.10 
 In this case, the Township argues that Knick failed to 
comply with the second Williamson County prong, exhaustion 
of state-law compensation remedies, because Knick did not 
                                                 
 10 As a general matter, “there is no requirement that a 
plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies before bringing 
a § 1983 action.” Cty. Concrete Corp. v. Town of 
Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159, 168 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 192). Williamson County’s 
second prong therefore is not a “true” exhaustion 
requirement, but “merely addresses a unique aspect of 
Just Compensation Takings claims.” Id. 
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pursue inverse-condemnation proceedings under 
Pennsylvania’s Eminent Domain Code, 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 101 et seq. See Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286, 
291 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiffs’ takings claim was 
not ripe because they did not file an inverse-condemnation 
petition). Knick responds that she was not required to pursue 
inverse-condemnation proceedings for three reasons. First, 
Knick argues that her facial takings claim is exempt from 
exhaustion. Second, Knick argues that she did in fact comply 
with Williamson County by unsuccessfully suing for 
declaratory and injunctive relief in state court. And third, 
Knick argues that we should overlook Williamson County’s 
prudential requirements in the interest of efficiency. We reject 
all three arguments. 
A 
 First, Knick argues that her facial takings claim need not 
be exhausted through state-court procedures. Specifically, 
Knick asserts that this Court wrongly decided County 
Concrete Corp. v. Town of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 
2006), the case relied upon by the District Court, which 
required exhaustion for a similar facial claim. We cannot 
overrule our own precedent, but we nonetheless conclude that 
Knick’s argument is misplaced. 
 There is no question that the first prong of Williamson 
County, the finality rule, does not apply to “a claim that the 
mere enactment of a regulation . . . constitutes a taking 
without just compensation.” Id. at 164. That exception to the 
finality rule makes sense: if the mere enactment of the 
ordinance constitutes a taking, there would be no need to wait 
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for any “final decision.” See CMR D.N. Corp. v. City of 
Philadelphia, 703 F.3d 612, 626–27 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 The question before us is whether facial claims are also 
exempt from the second prong of Williamson County, the 
exhaustion of state-law compensation remedies. In County 
Concrete, this Court held that “a facial Just Compensation 
Takings claim . . . does not relieve [plaintiffs] from the duty 
to seek just compensation from the state.” 442 F.3d at 168. 
The District Court correctly applied that holding here. 
 Knick argues, however, that our decision in County 
Concrete is contrary to Supreme Court authority. For 
example, in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. San Francisco, the 
Supreme Court stated that the petitioners “have overstated the 
reach of Williamson County throughout this litigation” 
because the petitioners were “never required to ripen” their 
facial claims. 545 U.S. 323, 345 (2005). Similarly, in Suitum 
v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the Supreme Court noted 
that facial challenges “are generally ripe the moment the 
challenged regulation or ordinance is passed.” 520 U.S. 725, 
736 n.10 (1997); see also Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 
519, 533–34 (1992). 
 We clarify that there is no conflict between these lines of 
authority and that Williamson County’s second prong is 
applicable to this case. 
1 
 This “seeming inconsistency” in the law arises because 
the Supreme Court has used the word “facial” in two ways. 
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Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Cty. of Santa Barbara, 96 F.3d 401, 406 
(9th Cir. 1996). First, the Supreme Court has referred to a 
type of taking as “facial”—where “the mere enactment of a 
statute constitutes a taking.” Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n 
v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 494 (1987). Second, the 
Supreme Court has used the word “facial” to refer to a type of 
legal challenge that seeks to invalidate a taking rather than 
obtain just compensation. See Yee, 503 U.S. at 534 
(describing a facial challenge as one that “does not depend on 
the extent to which petitioners are . . . compensated”). These 
two uses of the term “facial” are conceptually distinct. 
 Regarding the first use—“facial taking”—it is important 
to understand that the government does not violate the Fifth 
Amendment simply because one of its actions “constitutes a 
taking.” Bituminous Coal, 480 U.S. at 494. The Fifth 
Amendment “does not prohibit the taking of private property, 
but instead places a condition on the exercise of that power”: 
the provision of just compensation. First English Evangelical 
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 
314 (1987); see Cty. Concrete, 442 F.3d at 168 (“[T]he Fifth 
Amendment bars not just the taking of property, but the 
taking of property without just compensation.” (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). Thus, “even if a zoning ordinance, 
on its face, ‘takes’ property for Fifth Amendment purposes, 
no constitutional violation occurs until the state refuses to 
justly compensate the property owner.” Sinclair Oil, 96 F.3d 
at 406. Accordingly, a facial taking is not automatically 
unconstitutional; it simply “gives rise to an unqualified 
constitutional obligation to compensate” the property owner. 
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning 
Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 320 (2002). 
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 The second use—“facial challenge”—describes a type of 
claim, not a type of taking. A plaintiff who brings a facial 
challenge attacks the “underlying validity” of a law or 
regulation that allegedly effectuates a taking. Lingle v. 
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 543 (2005). “No amount 
of compensation can authorize” a taking rooted in a facially 
invalid law. Id. When a party challenges the fundamental 
validity of a law, the claim turns on an issue that arises 
logically and temporally prior to the denial of compensation. 
As such, there is no reason to wait for compensation to be 
denied; the constitutional violation would occur at the 
moment the invalid statute or regulation becomes effective. 
 This distinction between the facial takings and facial 
challenges explains how our decision in County Concrete is 
fully compatible with the Supreme Court’s statements in San 
Remo Hotel, Suitum, and Yee. Those Supreme Court cases 
each describe a facial challenge. See, e.g., San Remo Hotel, 
545 U.S. at 345–46 (noting that the plaintiffs “requested relief 
distinct from the provision of ‘just compensation’”). The 
Court was discussing a now-defunct legal theory: the claim 
that “a general zoning law to particular property effects a 
taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance a 
legitimate state interest.” Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 
255, 260 (1980). That test is no longer good law after Lingle, 
but modern plaintiffs have other tools at their disposal to 
challenge the underlying validity of a taking. “[I]f a 
government action is found to be impermissible—for instance 
because it fails to meet the ‘public use’ requirement or is so 
arbitrary as to violate due process—that is the end of the 
inquiry. No amount of compensation can authorize such 
action.” Lingle, 544 U.S. at 543. 
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 By contrast, the Fifth Amendment claim in County 
Concrete for which this Court required exhaustion was not a 
facial challenge. The taking occurred on the face of an 
ordinance, but the plaintiff merely sought compensation. That 
is why this Court emphasized that the claim at issue was “a 
facial Just Compensation Takings claim.” Cty. Concrete, 442 
F.3d at 168 (second and third emphases added). The 
plaintiff’s true facial challenges to the law—for violating 
Substantive Due Process and the Equal Protection Clause—
were not subject to exhaustion. Id. at 168–69; see Sinclair 
Oil, 96 F.3d at 406 (noting that the “seeming inconsistency” 
should be resolved “by analyzing the type of facial taking 
claim at issue in a particular case”).11 
                                                 
 11 Knick further argues that County Concrete was 
overruled by Horne v. Department of Agriculture, which 
noted that “[a] ‘Case’ or ‘Controversy’ exists once the 
government has taken private property without paying for 
it” regardless of “whether an alternative remedy exists.” 
133 S. Ct. 2053, 2062 n.6 (2013). But there, the Supreme 
Court was discussing constitutional requirements under 
Article III, not prudential ripeness under Williamson 
County. Horne in fact reaffirmed that “a Fifth 
Amendment claim is premature until it is clear that the 
Government has both taken property and denied just 
compensation.” Id. at 2062. The Court in Horne 
concluded that the takings claim was not premature, but 
only because the usual remedies had been withdrawn. 
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 To summarize, a plaintiff may be excused from the first 
prong of Williamson County depending on the type of taking 
alleged. If the taking occurred through an exercise of 
discretion, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the government 
reached a final decision. Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 186. 
But if the taking occurred on the face of a statute, ordinance, 
or regulation, that requirement does not apply. Cty. Concrete, 
442 F.3d at 164–65. As for Williamson County’s second 
prong, the plaintiff may be excused from exhausting state-law 
remedies depending on the type of claim asserted and the 
form of relief appropriate for that claim. If the plaintiff’s 
claim is based on a lack of compensation—i.e., the claim 
arises under the Just Compensation Clause—then the plaintiff 
must first seek compensation under state law (provided the 
state’s procedures are adequate). Id. at 168. If instead the 
plaintiff challenges the underlying validity of the taking, 
perhaps for lacking a public purpose or for violating due 
process, then the denial of compensation is irrelevant to the 
existence of a ripe claim and Williamson County’s second 
prong is inapplicable. Id. at 168–69. 
2 
 Despite their being characterized as facial challenges, 
Knick’s claims are, unavoidably, claims for compensation. 
They are therefore subject to exhaustion under Williamson 
County. 
                                                                                                             
Knick has not argued that remedies through inverse-
condemnation proceedings are unavailable. 
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 Knick does not claim that the alleged taking violates the 
Public Use Clause. Furthermore, the District Court dismissed 
the due-process claims asserted in Knick’s original complaint, 
and Knick does not appeal that ruling. All that remains is the 
allegation that the Township violated the Fifth Amendment 
because it took Knick’s property without compensation. As 
pled in the Second Amended Complaint: 
36. The Ordinance requires private property 
owners to allow the general public to enter, 
traverse, and occupy their private land, without 
compensation, every day of the year. As such, 
on its face, the Ordinance causes an 
unconstitutional physical invasion and taking of 
private property. 
37. The Ordinance also causes an 
unconstitutional physical taking on its face in 
authorizing the Township’s “Code Enforcement 
Officer and/or his/her agents and 
representatives” to enter, traverse and occupy 
private property for the purpose of determining 
the “existence” of any cemetery, without any 
provision of compensation to the effected 
owners. 
. . . 
42. As applied to Plaintiff, the Ordinance 
effects an uncompensated physical taking of her 
property by requiring Plaintiff to open her 
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private property to the public, on pain of civil 
fines and penalties. 
App. 263–64 (emphases added). 
 To be sure, Knick’s Second Amended Complaint seeks 
injunctive relief. But Knick has no surviving claim that the 
taking itself was invalid, apart from the fact that she has not 
received compensation. The remedy for an uncompensated 
(but otherwise valid) taking is compensation. 
 Knick argues that invalidation of the Ordinance is still 
appropriate because the Ordinance does not provide a self-
contained mechanism for compensating property owners. 
This argument is misplaced. “[T]he Fifth Amendment [does 
not] require that just compensation be paid in advance of, or 
contemporaneously with, the taking; all that is required is that 
a reasonable, certain and adequate provision for obtaining 
compensation exist at the time of the taking.” Williamson 
Cty., 473 U.S. at 194 (internal quotation marks omitted). That 
provision here is inverse-condemnation proceedings under 
Pennsylvania’s Eminent Domain Code. 
 Accordingly, we conclude that Knick’s claims arise under 
the Just Compensation Clause subject to exhaustion under 
Williamson County and must therefore be exhausted using 
inverse-condemnation proceedings. 
B 
 Second, Knick argues that she exhausted state-law 
remedies because she sued unsuccessfully in state court. We 
disagree. 
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 The Eminent Domain Code provides the “complete and 
exclusive procedure and law to govern all condemnations of 
property for public purposes and the assessment of damages.” 
26 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 102(a). Knick did not pursue the 
“complete and exclusive procedure” to obtain compensation, 
id., and therefore failed to ripen her claims, see Cowell, 263 
F.3d at 291. 
 Knick’s state-court action only sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief, not compensation. As such, Knick could not 
have “been denied compensation” as part of that action. 
Williamson Cty., 473 U.S. at 195; see Bd. of Supervisors of 
Shenango Twp. v. McClimans, 597 A.2d 738, 742 n.5 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1991) (“[A]ny claim for monetary damages is 
not properly before this Court and must be pursued under the 
provisions of the Eminent Domain Code.”). Furthermore, the 
claims for injunctive relief presented to the state court (such 
as Knick’s due-process challenge) are no longer before us. 
Even if they were, they would not be subject to Williamson 
County exhaustion. Cty. Concrete, 442 F.3d at 168–69.12 
                                                 
 12 Knick also argues that her state-court action was 
proper under Weinberg v. Comcast Cablevision of Phila., 
L.P., 759 A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000). But in that 
case, the plaintiff claimed that a legislative act stripped 
access to the “elaborate procedures” in the Eminent 
Domain Code for assessment of damages. Id. at 400. 
Knick has not alleged that inverse-condemnation 
remedies are unavailable here. 
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 Accordingly, we conclude that Knick’s earlier state 
lawsuit did not constitute exhaustion of state-law 
compensation remedies for purposes of Williamson County’s 
second prong. 
C 
 Finally, Knick argues that Williamson County is a 
prudential doctrine, and we may therefore overlook it in 
appropriate cases. We decline to do so here. 
 Knick’s initial premise is correct: Williamson County’s 
requirements are prudential. See Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 133 
S. Ct. 2053, 2062 (2013). But “merely because exhaustion 
requirements are prudential does not mean that they are 
without teeth. Even prudential exhaustion requirements will 
be excused in only a narrow set of circumstances.” Wilson v. 
MVM, Inc., 475 F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2007). 
 Several of our sister circuits have declined to enforce 
Williamson County’s requirements based on the equities 
presented in individual cases. Knick relies primarily on 
Sansotta v. Town of Nags Head, 724 F.3d 533, 545 (4th Cir. 
2013), and its companion case Town of Nags Head v. 
Toloczko, 728 F.3d 391 (4th Cir. 2013). In Sansotta, the 
Fourth Circuit overlooked Williamson County because the 
defendant removed the action to federal court, thwarting the 
plaintiff’s effort to exhaust. The defendant’s “manipulation” 
provided strong equitable reasons to overlook exhaustion. 
Sansotta, 724 F.3d at 545; see also Sherman v. Town of 
Chester, 752 F.3d 554, 564 (2d Cir. 2014). In Toloczko, the 
property owner was a defendant in an action brought by the 
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state to compel the demolition of their property. The property 
owners removed the action to federal court, and only then 
asserted counterclaims under the Takings Clause. The Fourth 
Circuit noted that, if the owner was required to go back to 
state court, they would have been subjected to “piecemeal 
litigation” in two forums at once. 728 F.3d at 399 (quoting 
San Remo Hotel, 545 U.S. at 346); see also Horne, 133 S. Ct. 
at 2063–64 (holding that petitioners could raise a takings 
defense in an enforcement action). 
 For another example, the Ninth Circuit declined to enforce 
Williamson County in Guggenheim v. City of Goleta, 638 F.3d 
1111 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc). First, the Court rejected the 
claim on the merits, “so it would be a waste of the parties’ and 
the courts’ resources to bounce the case through more rounds 
of litigation.” Id. at 1118. Second, the Court noted that “the 
law changed after their trip to state court,” and “it is hard to 
see any value in forcing a second trip on them.” Id. 
 Knick does not argue that inverse-condemnation 
proceedings would be unavailable or futile. Instead, she 
argues that allowing her claims to proceed would be more 
efficient and would avoid piecemeal litigation. But because 
Knick’s Just Compensation Clause claims are all that remain 
in the case, there is no risk of piecemeal litigation comparable 
to Toloczko. Nor has Knick identified any exceptional 
circumstance—such as the Township thwarting her access to 
inverse-condemnation proceedings as in Sansotta, or a change 
in applicable law after state-court proceedings concluded as 
in Guggenheim. Even if it were more efficient to allow 
Knick’s claims to proceed, that would be true in any case 
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where a litigant asks a court to waive her failure to meet a 
prudential requirement. 
 Finally, the Ninth Circuit declined to enforce Williamson 
County because it was more efficient to simply reject the 
property owner’s claims on the merits. Guggenheim, 638 F.3d 
at 1118; see also MHC Fin. Ltd. P’ship v. City of San Rafael, 
714 F.3d 1118, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013). While we do not rule on 
the merits here, we note that Knick’s claims do not suffer 
from any obvious infirmities that would tempt us to follow 
the Ninth Circuit’s example. Knick relies on a straightforward 
application of the Supreme Court’s decision in Nollan v. 
California Coastal Commission, which found it “obvious” 
that an easement for public access across private property 
constituted a permanent physical taking. 483 U.S. 825, 831 
(1987); see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 
180 (1979). The fact that the Ordinance only mandates public 
access during daylight hours does not change the fact that 
land must be accessible every day, indefinitely. See Ark. 
Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 519 
(2012) (noting that, in United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 
(1917), “‘inevitably recurring’” flooding created a permanent 
condition on the land, which “gave rise to a takings claim no 
less valid than the claim of an owner whose land was 
continuously kept under water”); Hendler v. United States, 
952 F.2d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[T]he concept of 
permanent physical occupation does not require that in every 
instance the occupation be exclusive, or continuous and 
uninterrupted.”). 
 In sum, even prudential requirements should not be lightly 
cast aside. We think there is “value in forcing a second trip” 
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to state court here. Guggenheim, 638 F.3d at 1118. The 
Commonwealth’s inverse-condemnation mechanism is better 
equipped to value Knick’s land than the federal courts, and 
litigants must be incentivized to pursue relief through proper 
channels. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s 
order dismissing the takings claims without prejudice pending 
exhaustion of state-law compensation remedies. 
V 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of 
the District Court. 
 
